1. Because of course the epistemological problem with
Absurdism (and with a little finagling, Emotivism) is that it separates the Good
from the true. Many atheists would be surprised at their own, latent Christianity
(not to mention Platonism) at assuming the necessary relationship between true utterances
and their value as truth. There is no such necessity. If I may borrow and abuse
Kripke, the relationship of a truth to its value as truth is contingent a priori. Only given state of affairs
“x” where objective value exists can we say that true utterance ‘U’ is
objectively valuable. In state of affairs “y” where there is no objective value,
and only true utterance ‘U’ obtains, a theory of the relationship between the value
and true utterance is necessarily subjective: that is, arbitrary, sentimentally
inclined, or more to the point, not actually
valuable.
Thus for the Absurdist who says, “the world is ultimately reducible to axiological meaninglessness,” the value of that utterance as true only obtains insofar as it rises in conjunction with a preset theory of quasi-value. In comes Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus and the like: sentimentalists. To even be consistent with themselves these thinkers can only call a true utterance quasi-valuable when that utterance supports the overarching, preset quasi-value conditions each thinker supplies. This proves a difficult task for one very simple reason. These thinkers operate from the Western, nay, human belief that the true and the Good ‘line up.’ They think that the truth is objectively valuable.
2. The pride of Raskolnikov, of the underground man, of Kierkegaard, of Camus, of Kafka, all consists in one very true truth: they have guts and most people do not. But one mistake I’ve noted of which all these existential thinkers are guilty is the conflation of intellectual naivety and intellectual weakness. They are not the same. Some people are simply incapable of complex self-reflection or reflection on abstract qualia. I do not think these thinkers nor we are disgusted with this phenomenon. We are disgusted with something else. (Granted this unintelligent class is smaller than people think: one symptom of the problem is that too many people think that too many people are incapable of complex thought.) What we despise is cowardice not weakness. We despise banal distractions and a mechanical existence. We despise the psychological road blocks by which people barricade themselves; we despise the safety net and the self-delusions. Really, the existentialists are probably the most honest people in all the world, and they can’t stand liars. Existentialists have stared at the absurd face to face, and find it difficult to tolerate those who have not.
3. I want to talk about a class of phrases. They go something like, “only God knows” or “God obviously doesn’t want us to know” or “it’s one of God’s mysteries.” Theologically I have no problem whatsoever with these phrases when they are used rightly. They act as logical placeholders which function within a theological framework meant to distinguish the greatness of God from the weakness of man. I get that. That’s obvious. But I have a very simple observation: most of the time that people use these phrases, they are not distinguishing between God’s greatness and man’s weakness, they are pussyfooting around intellectual issues. In other words either laziness or cowardice results in intellectual cop-outs. This occurs 9 times out of 10, and it s stupid and sinful.
4.The word cautious is used when the word terrified is meant. That’s half the trouble now. Caution probably should never have implied something negative. It should have meant something like, “look what happens when you abuse out this or that good,” not, “avoid that good because it’ll cost you if you abuse it.” This is one fundamental problem with Christian fundamentalism. It avoids goods like a Buddhist monk and calls it Christian. There is a difference between setting oneself up for failure and over-generalizing the dangers of, say, alcohol. It is the difference between struggling with alcoholism and the potential to struggle with alcoholism. Everyone has the potential to struggle with alcoholism. Likewise everyone has the potential to murder. But we don’t advocate avoiding human contact because we might kill a few of people. Why do we avoid alcohol if we only might become alcoholics?
Fundamentalists might answer that the proclivity for alcoholism is greater than murder. In the first place this is simply false. Many have murdered and turned to alcohol for consolation, not the other way around. Proclivities are particular to persons. This brings me to my second point: to talk of universal proclivities is an example of the ridiculous fundamental generalization. Fundamentalists generalize because fundamentalists are lazy thinkers and psychological weaklings. They want their rule fixed so they can follow it without having to think about particulars. They do not want to see Bob the man, how on Saturday he can have this proclivity and Tuesday not, how Bob might intentionally change his proclivities for the sake of God and the church, how Bob might transform altogether simply as a matter of course and never desire a drink, or how Bob might continue to struggle with alcoholism. They want a formula; they want to reduce Bob to sentence, as if a man were merely ‘an alcoholic’ or ‘a recovered alcoholic’ or ‘a recovering alcoholic.’ They want to say, “Well, since alcohol destroyed Bob’s life, we should all avoid it too.” But the trouble is that this is logically equivalent to saying, “Well, since Mary’s marriage destroyed her life, we should avoid it too.” The evil is not the thing, but the abuse of the thing. The thing itself is good. Because obviously there are goods which, unlike food and water, are not necessary to living—alcohol and marriage—which are disastrous when abused but good when not. That’s what the fundamentalist will never understand. Proper drinking is a beautiful thing, a laudable practice, a Christian virtue. And when he does not participate in it in the right way, he intentionally ignores a part of God’s creation. It would be like waking up at dawn and refusing to look at the sunrise for fear that one might commit idolatry. The beauty of nature can make us idolatrous, but does it follow that we should walk around blindfolded?
7 comments:
"Thus for the Absurdist who says, “the world is ultimately reducible to axiological meaninglessness,” the value of that utterance as true only obtains insofar as it rises in conjunction with a preset theory of quasi-value. In comes Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus and the like: sentimentalists. To even be consistent with themselves these thinkers can only call a true utterance quasi-valuable when that utterance supports the overarching, preset quasi-value conditions each thinker supplies. This proves a difficult task for one very simple reason. These thinkers operate from the Western, nay, human belief that the true and the Good ‘line up.’ They think that the truth is objectively valuable."
I think Nietzsche would take strong issue with being lumped in that category, given his frequent categorization of the truth-seeking impulse as exactly that, a "Will to Truth" retained from a Christian heritage (and, to his mind, self-defeating of that heritage), and by no means an intrinsically valuable endeavor. Half the time he even described it in pathological terms, attributing to it a great deal of the existential misery often associated with nihilism.
Caleb i think you're right only as far as Nietzsche's negative account goes. The second he opts for a positive account--which he does-- he neglects this aspect of his negative account. It's one advantage of his non-systematic approach that it goes unnoticed. Nonetheless, you'll have to agree that the second he says, (very very roughly) 'the will to power' is the right, he breaks his own rule.
It depends on how you interpret his use of the Will to Power, and for that matter his "positive" project as a whole. There was a time when I would have agreed with you 100% about the failure of his moral project in that sense, but over years of study of his works I've come to agree with Leiter that Nietzsche probably doesn't think he's doing anything of the sort.
To categorize his moral project in those positive/negative terms is inherently to judge them by the terminology of a Christian tradition he has already discarded. For Nietzsche, I think, admonition of the Will to Power is an appeal not to general moral sensibilities but to a particular set of "kindred spirits," if you will, for whom he considered the greatest possible fulfillment to be the embracing of that Will. A psychological, philological claim much more so than an ethically philosophical one.
I agree that this could indeed be categorized as a kind of sentimentalism, but I'm sure Nietzsche would have rejected that label equally on account of its conformance to a standard linguistic tradition within moral philosophy, which he ultimately discarded as a practice completely (meta-ethics excepting, of course). If anything, Nietzsche is writing closer to the vein of his successors in the psychoanalytic schools who sought to give people not any kind of existential positivism (non-moral sense) but a deeper awareness of their own identity through understanding of the Wills that form their belief structures. This is a very distinct practice from the sort with which psychology (and especially cognitive psychology) have since become associated; it seeks "Happiness" no more than it does "Goodness," neither as an end nor a means to another.
Instead, Nietzsche seems to be aiming at something far more individually defined in his embrace of the übermensch, a process of personally "becoming" that he only begins to explicate in his later works. While we can only draw a crude picture from the fragments he completed for his mental collapse and death, he seemed to be aiming toward something far more intentionally contingent in this project than what we would traditionally categorize under ethical labels, probably closer to something between a thesis of aesthetics and psychology of the sort he had obsessed with in his early years and that with age he seemed to be re-evaluating and repurposing. Something, perhaps, much closer to the Aristotelian virtue project than any exploration of morals since, at least if you ask MacIntyre.
How much of this is my own reading (or MacIntyres, Leiter's, and any number of other scholars that influenced my interpretation) and how much is Nietzsche's, who can say. But I did write a couple papers expanding on it a few years back, if you ever have any interest in hearing where my ramblings were headed.
You obviously know your Nietzsche better than i do, so i'm willing to concede on a number of points. I do have some thoughts, though:
1. positive and negative aren't tied, at least in the way i've heard them used, to Christian/Western anything. You could substitute constructive and deconstructive and get the same meaning. Maybe we read different books and have different professors.
2. I don't deny that Nietzsche wouldn't have called himself a sentimentalist. But i think Nietzsche is wrong. Also, he's free to reject the traditional vocabulary, and replace it with a sort of metaphorical language--disease, 'beyond' good and evil, pathological--, but i reject the relevancy of a metaphorical vocabulary independent of a tradition.
3. You're probably right about his overarching disinterest in ethics(again i concede to your knowledge of Nietzsche) but my comments aren't immediately concerned with ethics. I'm talking about value theory in general.
What I mean, in shortest form, is that Nietzsche isn't making a traditional moral appeal of the form "you should be/do x"; he's saying "you should be/do x IF y," "y" being a state of having similarly driven Wills and desires to his own, including, say, a desire to feel a certain set of things, to achieve a certain mental state, etc. Again, a psychological/physiological claim. He's not saying there's anything good or bad about it in any ontological or objective sense, just that it's what appeals to him as the most mentally fulfilling way to live and that like-minded people might find the same thing.
If that's a moral claim, it's an incredibly weak one by comparison with any traditional use of the term (with Kantianism somewhere on the opposite extreme), and I'm not sure it fits the basic definitions of sentimentalism I've heard put forward ("You SHOULD do what you feel is good," or something similar). But I can see how that would fall into a very broad, very literal definition of sentimentalism, even if it's pretty significantly different from anything Mencius, Shaftesbury, Adam Smith, Hume, Blackbury, Confucius, or Camus ever argued for.
Perhaps that's where we've been talking past each other. I've been more occupied with a broader, more literal conception of sentimentalism--and maybe a little loose in my use of it too. I do mean something like, "I find myself with this set of desires, wills, interests, etc, and that's how i'm going to operate." The traditional 'ought' is, as you hint, absent here, and thus perhaps weakness it as a moral claim.
But i'm not sure. To say that morality probably should not be or simply is not what traditionalists have said is to make an ontological claim. In fact it probably doesn't weaken it so much as change it or avoid it altogether within a new grammar: that grammar being tied closely to the accidental properties of Nietzsche's 'being' or identity.
That makes me wonder, though, Nietzsche doesn't strike me as an essentialist (i don't know.) So what? is he doing a sort of descriptivists account of himself, and constructing his conception of the will to power from there? Maybe you know, maybe you don't. I've only read the excerpts (albeit lengthy) of The Will To Power, Zarathustra, and The Gay Science. The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morality are all i've fully read.
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