Wednesday, May 30, 2012

Scattered Thoughts on Method



         I have a penchant for putting the Christian faith in awkward situations. What happens, I often wonder, when you run this or that idea through the theoretical machinery of Christianity? Sometimes I think the machinery fails. That is, one particular brand of Christian theory fails, and a better, more suitable theory must be found to replace it. In the end, this method will probably result in me converting to Eastern Orthodoxy, or something. For now, however, it has only resulted in the near total abandonment of Evangelicalism.
        The problem with this method, I’m afraid, is that I have been raised by and large within an Evangelical setting. So when I say ‘Christian’ I conflate it, and was taught to conflate it, with ‘Evangelical.’ Really, when I say anything ‘Christian’ I probably mean something ‘Evangelical.’ At the very least, my starting stock vocabulary is Evangelical. This is tantamount to saying that I have a biased and prejudiced psychology informed by my vocabulary. We all do. In fact, the salient trait I’ve noted about converts to atheism is the narrowness of their views on Christianity. Rarely do they mean Christianity at large: of my atheist friends in this country, most live on the Eastern seaboard, and by Christian they mean Eastern seaboard Evangelicalism and the theoretical framework it espouses.
        But I know better than that, and realize that the actual facts place Evangelicalism on the fringe of Christian belief—historically, and, in more ways than ten, doctrinally. Ask any contemporary religious theorist, and he will tell you how little work has been done of those odd Evangelicals. Don’t take what I’m saying too far, though, I’m cheating (and so are the theorists) when I use ‘Evangelical’ as if its an agreed upon term. It isn’t. It can mean fundamentalist/ emergent/ anarchist/anti-intellectualist/solo scripturalist/ Calvinist/ Presbyterian/ Baptist/ American / superstitious/ emotivist/ etc/etc/etc. Depending on who you talk to it can be a positive or negative term. Any of these terms can. Fundamentalists do not take offense to being called fundamentalists: they take pride in it. The same with Calvinists and solo scripturalists. As far as I’m concerned, of course, they’re all something equivalent to a clown in a ball pit at the end of a rainbow. But in any event, what I mean when I say Evangelical is informed by the environ within which I grew up. Probably it is a useless word.
        So what am I talking about? If I had the space, and you had the patience, I would give numerous case studies to show what exactly happens in the process of theoretical paradigm shifting. There is a psychology to it. What happens to the literal/eternal view of hell, for example, when you ask the question, “how can God be a just God and require infinite punishment for finite sin”? If you don’t have counter-intuitions, fine, but it’s not because the question isn’t problematic to the view, it’s because you don’t understand the problem. The fact that you neglect the problem demonstrates something about the weakness of your curiosity, not the weakness of the problem. And if, as an alternative view, something like Annihilationism doesn’t, intuitively (and
prima facie), solve the problem for you, then you are stilted yet again for some reason or another. In these cases, the problem is not the weakness of the proposed criticism or solution, it is the receiver of said criticism or solution. Where the idea cannot even be understood, how can it be said to be wrong?
        Anyway, its the intuition or counter-intuition I’m after, and I’m after them because
I’m after the psychology of theorizing.  Theoretical shifting occurs through the conduit of intuitions, not beliefs or knowledge. What happens when the very intuitions we have are biased in favor of this or that system? All intuitions are biased. What happens, moreover, when the very systems we appeal to are biased in favor of intuitions? All systems are biased. Do we dive into the hermeneutic circle, letting our intuitions inform our overarching theories and our overarching theories inform our intuitions? Probably the answer is that we have no option in the matter, and yes. Time to strap on our speedos and take the plunge.  
        I think when we engage theory this way we find that the dialectic will push us toward a more prominent theoretical structure. I think this method will keep us vigilant and always willing to learn. I think this method will ensure that we have to hold more beliefs in abeyance than we wish—a sort of willing suspension of belief thing. I think this method will make us agnostics, but not dogmatic agnostics.

2 comments:

Caleb said...

The "culture war" so often associated with evangelicalism in the public sphere (by both sides) seems to have much more to do with battling psyches than with actual ideas. Evangelicalism, under my own admittedly narrow, anecdotal, and inadequate definition, is less a coherent weltanschauung than it is a reactionary psychological rebellion against a far wider and more nuanced range of Christian traditions. These days I'm far more tempted to assess it in psychoanalytic terms than to engage it as an actual philosophy, given that its most vocal proponents proudly reject so many of the fundamental precepts of rational discourse that make such conversations possible.

Of course, I'll also be the first to admit that most of my rhetoric upon my departure from the church was every bit as reactionary and narrowly targeted as theirs.

KevinsBlog said...

Caleb, i'm not sure i'd want to separate a weltanschauung (coherent or not) from its psychological causes. The two always seem to work in tandem. The theory fits the felt need.For example,(and roughly) what is religion at large if not an attempt to answer the feelings of meaninglessness posed by the absurd?

You are certainly right, however, to engage Evangelicalism (that ever useless word) not as a philosophical school but a psychological condition. I've called it anti-intellectualism, but you might be onto something more accurate, or at least, more poignant in treating it as a symptom or condition of something else.